Wage subsidies and international trade: when does policy coordination pay? by Braun, S. & Spielmann, Christian
ISSN 1745-8587 
B
irk
be
ck
 W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
s 
in
 E
co
no
m
ic
s 
&
 F
in
an
ce
 
 
 
School of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics 
 
 
 
BWPEF 1007 
 
 
 
Wage subsidies and international 
trade: When does policy coordination 
pay? 
 
 
Sebastian Braun 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy 
 
 
 
Christian Spielmann 
Birkbeck, University of London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 2010 
▪ Birkbeck, University of London ▪ Malet Street ▪ London ▪ WC1E 7HX ▪ 
Wage subsidies and international trade: When does
policy coordination pay?∗
Sebastian Braun† and Christian Spielmann‡
March 22, 2010
Abstract
National labour market institutions interact across national boundaries when
product markets are global. Labour market policies can thus entail spill-overs, a
fact widely ignored in the academic literature. This paper studies the effects of
wage subsidies in an international duopoly model with unionised labour markets.
We document both positive and negative spill-over effects and discuss the benefits
and costs from international policy coordination both for the case of symmetric
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1 Introduction
National labour markets interact across national boundaries when product markets
are global. Labour market policies can then have spill-over effects, which suggests
that there are benefits from international policy coordination. Surprisingly, the
academic literature has widely neglected the international effects of national labour
market policies and the benefits (and potential costs) of coordinating them. Our
paper is a first attempt to fill this gap. We study the effects of wage subsidies
in an international duopoly model with unionised labour markets and discuss the
costs and benefits from policy coordination both for the case of symmetric and
asymmetric labour market institutions.
In the international policy arena, attempts have been made to coordinate pol-
icy making in many areas such as monetary policy, competition policy or product
standards. Labour market policies, in contrast, remain mostly in national hands.
The European Union (EU) is both a prime candidate for coordinative action and an
example for the slow progress labour market policy coordination has made so far.
In fact, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 asks all member states to treat employment
’as a matter of common concern and [to] coordinate their action’ (European Union,
1997). Against this background the EU has designed an open method of coordina-
tion under which member states formulate common policy targets on the EU level
but national governments design and implement appropriate policies to reach these
targets.1 Therefore, the interpretation of coordination in the area of labour market
policies remains much weaker than in other policy areas.
Our analysis focuses on wage subsidies, which are an increasingly popular policy
tool in many industrialised countries.2 We construct a simple two-country trade
model where product markets are linked through costly intra-industry trade. Each
country hosts one firm that produces a horizontally differentiated good. In our model
setup, imperfections in both the labour and the product market provide a rationale
for subsidising wages. Labour markets are unionised and thus the prevailing wage
rate is above its market-clearing level. In addition, governments pay unemployment
benefits that increase the outside option of unions in the wage bargain. Finally,
1One exception is the ‘European Globalisation Adjustment Fund’ that finances active labour market
policies for workers who have been made redundant as a result of the globalisation process.
2Wage subsidies have been implemented in a number of countries, e.g. in Germany (Kombi-Lohn),
Great Britain (Working Families Tax Credit) and the United States (Earned Income Tax Credit, EITC).
It has been argued that, whereas traditional unemployment benefit systems increase the moral hazard
problem and may prolong unemployment spells (see, e.g., Krueger and Mueller, 2010, for recent evidence),
active labour market policies may be able to increase job-search incentives of the unemployed (see, e.g.,
Layard et al., 2005).
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high entry barriers lead to imperfect competition in the product market and thus
to inefficiently low levels of production and employment. Wage subsidies respond
to these market imperfections by driving a wedge between the wage received by
workers and the labour costs paid by firms. Such a policy reduces production costs
and fosters labour demand without creating working poverty (Orszag and Snower,
2003).
Even though rigid labour market institutions lead to inefficiently high unemploy-
ment they are often politically infeasible to relax quickly (Saint-Paul, 2000). Since
these institutions have emerged over years of bargaining between interest groups and
governments, they can usually be changed only gradually and with considerable de-
lay. To make our analysis especially relevant to policy makers, we therefore take
the imperfections in the labour (and product) markets as given and examine the
best policy response with these imperfections in place. In our model policymaker
set wage subsidies so as to maximise welfare (subject to a budget constraint). Gov-
ernments can either set wage subsidies unilaterally or coordinate their policies to
maximise joint welfare. For most parts of the paper we consider a specific (and par-
ticularly popular) form of policy coordination where governments harmonise their
policies and choose a common subsidy level. We then relax this assumption and
allow for cooperating governments to agree on country specific subsidy policies.
Even in our simple model wage subsidies paid to domestic producers have a wide
range of effects - in both the domestic and the foreign country. First, wage subsi-
dies increase domestic wages and employment but decrease them abroad. Second,
wage subsidies increase profits of the domestic firm but decrease profits abroad.
Third, wage subsidies reduce consumer prices and thus increase consumer surplus
at home and abroad. The relative strength of these effects is determined by the
degree of product differentiation. If, for instance, the two firms produce close sub-
stitutes, wage subsidies will have a stronger (negative) spill-over effect on foreign
employment, wages and profits.
National governments ignore the spill-over effects of wage subsidies when they
decide unilaterally about the optimal subsidy levels. With symmetric labour mar-
kets international policy coordination then always increases welfare in both coun-
tries. With asymmetric labour markets, however, cross-border policy harmonisation
entails costs. In particular, cooperating governments restrict their capability to ac-
count for the national features of their countries’ institutions. Even more, with
asymmetric labour market institutions costs and benefits of policy harmonisation
are unevenly distributed among trading partners. In fact, a common subsidy level
can benefit one country at the expense of the other. Policy harmonisation can hence
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be difficult to enforce politically - even if it increases aggregate welfare. Our analysis
thus provides a rationale for why labour market policies are still mostly in national
hands although cooperation might be beneficial from a bird’s eye perspective.
We consider two extensions of our benchmark model. First, we allow cooperat-
ing governments to choose country-specific subsidy levels and analyse the optimal
cooperative policy. Since policy-makers then have two instruments at hand, aggre-
gate welfare must be at least as high as if a common subsidy level were chosen.
Nevertheless, a country on its own might still prefer the (globally sub-optimal) har-
monisation policy. So even if policy cooperation could indeed be designed optimally
in the real world, countries can still disagree about which policy to implement. As
a second extension, we analyse governments that target employment rather than
welfare. After all, the prime motive for subsidising wages is usually to stimulate
employment (while adhering to some budget constraint). We demonstrate that un-
der an employment target governments do not account for the positive effect of wage
subsidies on consumer surplus, profit and labour income and thus set subsidy levels
that are too low from a welfare perspective.
The academic literature has discussed strategic interactions between govern-
ments and the resulting benefits from coordination with respect to a wide range
of policy issues - such as capital taxation, environmental regulations, and labour
standards - but has widely neglected labour market policies. As an exception,
Franzese and Hays (2006) provide empirical evidence for the European Union that
an increase in expenditure on labour market training programmes in one country de-
creases spending by its neighbours. They argue (without a formal model) that their
results could be explained by agglomeration effects along European border regions.
For instance, effective training policies in the French border region to Belgium may
attract Belgium workers and could enhance the pool of workers available for both
Belgium and French employers. Labour market training then entails positive exter-
nalities and provides incentives for (neighbouring) countries to free-ride on them.
In contrast, policy spill-overs in our model arise through product market linkages
and thus even in the absence of cross-border labour movements.3 Moreover, we
demonstrate that the existence of spill-over effects does not necessarily justify (any
form of) policy coordination, let alone make coordination politically enforceable.
More generally, our work is related to the strategic trade literature as pioneered
by Brander and Spencer (1984) and Brander and Spencer (1985).4 It is worth noting
3Beyond doubt, in case of the European Union the free movement of labour can induce further spill-
over effects not captured in our model. However, even within the EU labour mobility is still comparably
low (see Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2008).
4The basic structure of the underlying ‘reciprocal dumping model’ is described in Brander (1981).
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that in these models wage subsidies will have effects similar to a general production
subsidy to domestic firms if labour is the only input in production. More recently,
models of international oligopoly have also been used to analyse the choice of the
international commodity tax base (see, e.g., Haufler et al., 2005 and Haufler and
Pflu¨ger, 2007). A negative commodity tax collected under the origin principle (where
taxes are collected in the country of production) will effectively be identical to a
wage subsidy if labour is the only production factor. In fact, both wage subsidies
and commodity taxes drive a wedge between the wage rate and the labour costs
faced by firms.
Despite these strong analogies between wage subsidies on the one hand and pro-
duction subsidies and commodity taxes on the other hand, our analysis differs in
four important aspects from the classical strategic trade literature. First, we anal-
yse wage subsidies in an international duopoly model with unionised labour markets
along the lines of Naylor (1998).5 Since labour market imperfections are the prime
motive for active labour market policies, the question at hand can only be tackled
by modelling them explicitly. Second, in our model both wages and employment
are endogenous and labour income enters the welfare function that is maximised by
governments. The strategic trade literature, in contrast, typically abstracts from
labour income effects and considers changes in profit income and government rev-
enues only. Third, we consider cross-country differences in national labour market
institutions, namely differences in the generosity of national unemployment benefits.
Such differences turn out to be crucial for the costs and benefits from policy coordi-
nation. Fourth, we do not only consider welfare but also the value of employment as
a government target. After all, wage subsidies are most often promoted as a means
to stimulate employment (while preventing take-home wages to fall) rather than to
increase welfare overall.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The basic model setting
is presented in the next section. Sections 3 and 4 analyse the optimal responses
of firms and trade unions, respectively, to given subsidy policies. Section 5 de-
rives and compares the optimal welfare maximising subsidy levels under both policy
competition and coordination. The section also distinguishes between symmetric
and asymmetric labour market institutions. Section 6 discusses extensions of our
benchmark model. Finally, Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
5Naylor (1998) does not study government interventions. Recently, Moriconi and Sato (2009) have
analysed the effects of commodity taxation in a model with downward wage rigidity. However, their work
assumes perfect competition in the product market and abstracts from cross-country differences in the
labour market.
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2 The Model
There are two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F), where variables referring to the
latter are marked by an asterisk (∗). Each country is endowed with a continuum
of immobile consumers of unit measure 1.6 Utility of consumers is a quasilinear
function of a numeraire good m and the two differentiated products X and Y :
U (x, y,m) = a (x+ y)− 1
2
(
x2 + y2 + 2exy
)
+m, (1)
U∗ (x∗, y∗,m∗) = a (x∗ + y∗)− 1
2
(x∗ + y∗ + 2ex∗y∗) +m∗, (2)
where e ∈ [0, 1] is an inverse measure of product differentiation, and x and y denote
consumption of good X and Y , respectively. Production of the differentiated goods
X and Y is country-specific. Good X is produced by firm 1, which is located in
Home, while good Y is produced by the foreign-based firm 2.
Each consumer supplies inelastically one unit of labour to the differentiated
good sector,7 is endowed with Z units of the numeraire good (which describes the
individual endowment of non-labour assets), and may also receive an identical share
of profit income. Since a country-specific trade union raises wages above the market
clearing wage in each country, labour markets do not clear and workers can either
be employed or unemployed. Employed workers (marked with the subscript EM)
earn a wage w, while unemployed workers (UN) receive unemployment benefits of
size b. Denoting profits by Π and also allowing for the possibility of lump-sum taxes
h, the per-capita income of a type i worker (i = EM,UN) can be written as:
IEM = w + Π + Z − h, IUN = b+ Π + Z − h, (3)
I∗EM = w
∗ + Π∗ + Z∗ − h∗, I∗UN = b∗ + Π∗ + Z∗ − h∗. (4)
Consumers spend their income on consumption of the differentiated varieties x
and y and the numeraire good m. The budget constraint of a type i worker in Home
6Assuming labour to be immobile is a serious model limitation only if there are sizeable labour flows
between the two countries. In the past, labour mobility within Europe has been rather low compared
to for example the US (Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2008) and we shall see our model to be especially
applicable to the former. Nevertheless, labour mobility could become more important in the near future.
Allowing for migration is therefore an important extension to our analysis but one we leave for future
research.
7As in e.g. Moriconi and Sato (2009) we assume that the numeraire is not produced using labor.
Alternatively, one may think of workers being tied to the differentiated good sector due to e.g. sector-
specific human capital.
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and Foreign can then be written as:
Ii = pxx+ pyy +mi, I∗i = p
∗
xx
∗ + p∗yy
∗ +m∗i , (5)
where px and py are the prices of good X and Y .
In what follows, we will assume that consumers’ endowments of the numeraire
good are always large enough to guarantee positive demand for the numeraire good.
Profit maximisation then yields the following linear demand functions:8
px = a− (x+ ey), py = a− (ex+ y), (6)
p∗x = a− (x∗ + ey∗), p∗y = a− (ex∗ + y∗). (7)
On the supply side, the two firms are assumed to compete as Cournot duopolists in
segmented markets. Firms incur symmetric trading costs of t per unit of exports.
Trading costs are exogenously given and should reflect a wide range of costs, includ-
ing, for instance, transportation expenditures or costs of border formalities. Since
we focus on trade between industrialised countries - and in particular on intra-EU
trade - we assume that the two countries do not impose any revenue-generating
tariffs.
In order to produce one unit of the good each firm has to employ one unit of
labour. The governments of Home and Foreign pay a wage subsidy to their domestic
firm of size s and s∗, respectively, per unit of labour employed. Unit production
costs of firm 1 and 2 are thus given by w − s and w∗ − s∗ and profits of the two
firms read:
Π = (px − w + s)x+ (p∗x − w + s− t)x∗, (8)
Π∗ = (p∗y − w∗ + s∗ − t)y + (py − w∗ + s∗)y. (9)
Firms choose their level of production for the two markets so as to maximise profits.
In doing so, they take the output choices of their competitors as given.
Following Naylor (1998) wage rates in both countries are set by a country-specific
monopoly union that represents all the workers employed by the respective firm.
8With quasi-linear preferences all income effects are swept up by the numeraire good and demand for
the differentiated products is independent of aggregate income. A relevant path for further research is
thus the integration of the model into a framework of General Oligopolistic Equilibrium as proposed by
Neary (2002, 2003). In such a framework, wage subsidies could also affect aggregate employment through
changes in net labour income (and not only by reducing labour costs).
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Union objectives are given by the following Stone-Geary-type utility functions:
Ω = (w − b)L, Ω∗ = (w∗ − b∗)L∗, (10)
where L = x + x∗ and L∗ = y + y∗ are the employment levels of firm 1 and
2, respectively. Unions maximise insider rents taking the unemployment benefit
received by an unemployed worker as the outside option in the wage bargain. We
assume that unions do not collude but set the optimal wage rate taking the other
union’s wage demand as given. Firms retain their right-to-manage and can choose
their respective employment levels.
Governments in the two countries finance wage subsidies sL and unemployment
benefits (1 − L)b by levying a lump-sum tax h on its population. The respective
budget constraints therefore read:
h = sL+ b(1− L), h∗ = s∗L∗ + b∗(1− L∗). (11)
Policy makers take the imperfections in the labour (and product) markets as given
and implement the best policy response with these imperfections in place. In par-
ticular, due to political constraints policy makers take the country-specific levels
of unemployment benefits (b and b∗) as given and set wage subsidies in order to
maximise welfare subject to the budget constraint.9 An alternative target function,
based on (the value of) employment, is discussed in Section 6.2. National welfare W
is defined as the weighted average of (indirect) utilities of employed and unemployed
workers, respectively:
W = LU(x, y,mEM ) + (1− L)U(x, y,mUN )
=
x2 + y2
2
+ exy + Π + Lw + (1− L)b− h+ Z, (12)
W = L∗U∗(x∗, y∗,m∗EM ) + (1− L∗)U∗(x∗, y∗,m∗UN )
=
(x∗)2 + (y∗)2
2
+ ex∗y∗ + Π∗ + L∗w∗ + (1− L∗)b∗ − h∗ + Z∗. (13)
Notice that welfare can also be interpreted as the expected utility of a worker before
her employment status is determined. Welfare increases with consumer surplus (as
given by the first two terms in equations 12 and 13) and with the net income re-
9As it turns out, welfare in the model depends on the difference between subsidy level and unem-
ployment benefit. Governments thus implicitly choose the optimal difference s− b taking b as given. If,
instead, governments could choose both s and b, the equilibrium values of s and b would be indeterminate
because the optimal s−b could be reached by an infinite number of combinations of s and b. We interpret
the level of unemployment benefits as an expression of preferences that change only slowly over time.
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ceived by an average worker. Governments can either set wage subsidies unilaterally
(taking the policy of the trading partner as given) or coordinate their policies to
maximise joint welfare. We first assume that cooperating governments harmonise
wage subsidies to a common level. In Section 6.1, however, we relax this assumption
and discuss an optimal cooperation policy.
We consider a game of perfect information with the following timing of events:
1. The two governments set (non-cooperatively or cooperatively) the level of wage
subsidies in the two countries.
2. Each union chooses a wage rate.
3. Each firm chooses its output (and thus employment) levels for the two product
markets (home and abroad).
The game is solved by backward induction starting with the last stage of the decision
making process.
3 Stage 3: Production
Each firm maximises profits by choosing the quantity of goods produced for the
domestic and the foreign market. Throughout the paper we assume the parameter
a to be large enough relative to trading costs t for two-way intra-industry trade to
occur in equilibrium. The corresponding first-oder conditions are then given by:
∂Π
∂x
= a− 2x− ey − w + s = 0,
⇒ x = a− w + s
2
− ey
2
, (14)
∂Π
∂x∗
= a− 2x∗ − ey∗ − w + s− t = 0,
⇒ x∗ = a− w + s− t
2
− ey
∗
2
, (15)
∂Π∗
∂y
= a− 2y − ex− w∗ + s∗ − t = 0,
⇒ y = a− w
∗ + s∗ − t
2
− ex
2
, (16)
∂Π∗
∂y∗
= a− 2y∗ − ex∗ − w∗ + s∗ = 0,
⇒ y∗ = a− w
∗ + s∗
2
− ex
∗
2
. (17)
Equations (14)-(17) are the output reaction functions of the respective firm given
the output choices of its competitor, the firm-specific union wage, and the wage
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subsidy paid by the government. Solving the system of equation yields the optimal
production quantities:
x =
(2− e)a− 2(w − s) + e(w∗ − s∗) + et
4− e2 , (18)
x∗ =
(2− e)a− 2(w − s) + e(w∗ − s∗)− 2t
4− e2 , (19)
y =
(2− e)a− 2(w∗ − s∗) + e(w − s)− 2t
4− e2 , (20)
y∗ =
(2− e)a− 2(w∗ − s∗) + e(w − s) + et
4− e2 . (21)
Given the linear production technology, total employment of firm 1 and 2, respec-
tively, can then be written as:
L = x+ x∗ =
(2− e)(2a− t)− 4(w − s) + 2e(w∗ − s∗)
4− e2 , (22)
L∗ = y + y∗ =
(2− e)(2a− t)− 4(w∗ − s∗) + 2e(w − s)
4− e2 . (23)
Employment is therefore decreasing in a firm’s own net production costs but in-
creasing in the production costs of its competitor.
4 Stage 2: Wage Bargaining
When setting the wage rate each trade union faces a trade off between wages and
employment. By differentiating the unions’ utility functions with respect to the
wage rate, and using the expressions for employment in (22) and (23), we obtain
the following first order conditions:
∂Ω
∂w
=
(2− e)(2a− t)− 4(w − s) + 2e(w∗ − s∗)
4− e2
−4(w − b)
4− e2 = 0,
⇒ w = b
2
+
(2− e)(2a− t) + 4s+ 2e(w∗ − s∗)
8
, (24)
∂Ω∗
∂w∗
=
(2− e)(2a− t)− 4(w∗ − s∗) + 2e(w − s)
4− e2
−4(w
∗ − b∗)
4− e2 = 0,
⇒ w∗ = b
∗
2
+
(2− e)(2a− t) + 4s∗ + 2e(w − s)
8
. (25)
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Equations (24) and (25) can be interpreted as the optimal response of each union
to the wage set by the competing union and the subsidies paid by each government.
Solving the system of equations yields:
w =
8b+ 2eb∗ + 12(4 + e)(2− e)(2a− t) + (8− e2)s− 2es∗
16− e2 , (26)
w∗ =
8b∗ + 2eb+ 12(4 + e)(2− e)(2a− t) + (8− e2)s∗ − 2es
16− e2 . (27)
The domestic wage rate thus increases in both the domestic and the foreign unem-
ployment benefits as well as in the subsidy paid by the domestic government. In
contrast, domestic wages decrease in the subsidy paid to the foreign firm. The latter
finding is due to the fact that foreign wage subsidies, by decreasing production and
thus employment of the domestic firm, also decrease the marginal benefits of higher
wage demands.
5 Stage 1: Welfare Maximising Wage Subsi-
dies
At this stage governments choose the welfare-maximising subsidy levels taking into
account the optimal response of unions and firms abroad. Governments can either
set their own (national) wage subsidies unilaterally to maximise national welfare
or they can choose to cooperate and maximise joint welfare. Cooperating govern-
ments are assumed to harmonise their subsidy policies. We first analyse the case
of symmetric labour markets and then allow for cross-country differences in the
unemployment benefit systems.10
5.1 Symmetric Labour Markets
In the case of symmetric labour markets both countries pay the same level of unem-
ployment benefits b = b∗ per unemployed worker. Given the symmetry of the model,
in this subsection we shall only present equations for Home. Analogous equations
exist for Foreign as well.
In our model utility is derived from the consumption of the differentiated goods
X, Y and the numeraire good m. The latter in turn depends on income net off
10Cross-country differences in unemployment benefits are not only widespread in reality, they also
serve well to illustrate the general problems associated with policy harmonisation in the presence of
idiosyncratic institutional features. An interesting extension could consider the case where one country
has a unionised and the other a perfectly competitive labour market.
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taxes and net off consumption expenditures for X and Y . Before proceeding, it is
useful to reformulate the social welfare function in (12) in the following way:
W = 1/2
(
x2 + y2
)
+ exy︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consumer Surplus
+ Π + (x+ x∗)w + (1− x− x∗)b+ Z︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gross Income
−s(x+ x∗)− b(1− x− x∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Taxes
= 1/2
(
x2 + y2
)
+ exy︸ ︷︷ ︸
Consumer Surplus
+ Π + (x+ x∗)w − (x+ x∗)s+ Z︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net Income
≡ CS + Π + LI −GS + Z. (28)
Welfare thus increases with consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (Π) and labour
income of the employed (LI) but decreases with government spending on wage
subsidies (GS).
Decomposing the Effects of Wage Subsidies. Before calculating the op-
timal subsidy levels with and without policy cooperation, we consider the various
effects a wage subsidy has on welfare at home and abroad. Differentiating welfare
in Home with respect to the domestic subsidy s yields:
∂W
∂s
=
∂CS
∂s
+
∂Π
∂s
+
∂LI
∂s
− ∂GS
∂s
. (29)
Taking a closer look at the different elements of equation (29), we first of all see
that a higher wage subsidy increases domestic consumer surplus by reducing mar-
ket prices and alleviating the under-provision problem created by product market
imperfections:
∂CS
∂s
= x
(
∂x
∂s
+ e
∂y
∂s
)
+ y
(
∂y
∂s
+ e
∂x
∂s
)
=
(16− 6e2)x+ (12e− 2e3)y
64− 20e2 + e4 > 0. (30)
Notice that the positive effect of an increase in s on consumer surplus increases with
x and y. A consumer gains more from a given reduction in prices the higher her
consumption level is.
Secondly, higher domestic wage subsidies increase the profit level of the domestic
firm:
∂Π
∂s
=
4(8− e2)(x+ x∗)
64− 20e2 + e4 > 0. (31)
Wage subsidies drive a wedge between the wage rate and per-unit labour costs
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and thus reduce marginal production costs. The firm benefits more from a given
reduction in its marginal costs, when production x+ x∗ is large.
Thirdly, wage subsidies also increase total labour income, as given by the product
of wages and employment:
∂LI
∂s
= (x+ x∗)
∂w
∂s
+ w
∂(x+ x∗)
∂s
=
(x+ x∗)(8− e2)
16− e2 +
4w(8− e2)
64− 20e2 + e4 > 0. (32)
In particular, firms respond to lower labour costs by expanding production and
thus employment. Moreover, higher levels of employment induce unions to demand
higher wages (which somewhat dampens the positive employment effect). The effect
of s on labour income increases with both the level of employment and the wage
rate. The positive wage effect will apply to a larger number of workers if employment
is already high. Likewise, a given increase in employment will have larger income
effects if wages are high.
Taken together, wage subsidies do not only increase employment but also boost
consumer surplus, profits and wages. The welfare costs for the home economy come
in terms of higher government spending on wage subsidies:
∂GS
∂s
= s
∂(x+ x∗)
∂s
+ (x+ x∗)
=
4s(8− e2)
64− 20e2 + e4 + (x+ x
∗) > 0. (33)
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (33) represents additional expen-
ditures for those workers that would have been unemployed without the marginal
increase in s. Moreover, the state also has to pay higher subsidies for those al-
ready employed. This effect, reflected by the second term on the right-hand side, is
usually referred to as the deadweight effect of wage subsidies. The costs of further
increases in s therefore depend positively on the actual level of employment. Higher
government spending increases lump-sum taxes and thus reduces disposable income
available for the consumption of the numeraire good.
Beside the effect a wage subsidy has on the domestic economy, it also affects
welfare of the trading partner abroad. The effect of foreign wage subsidies on welfare
in Home can again be broken down into four parts:
∂W
∂s∗
=
∂CS
∂s∗
+
∂Π
∂s∗
+
∂LI
∂s∗
− ∂GS
∂s∗
. (34)
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Combining these four effects we identify two spill-over effects that a foreign wage
subsidy has on the home economy: First, the foreign wage subsidy decreases the
marginal cost of the foreign supplier and thus increases foreign production. This, in
turn, reduces the price level of X and Y in Home. We therefore observe a positive
consumer surplus spill-over :
∂CS
∂s∗
=
(24e− 4e3)x+ (32− 12e2)y
64− 20e2 + e4 > 0. (35)
When product markets are linked through trade, consumer thus benefit from wage
subsidies paid to the foreign firm.
Second, wage subsidies paid to the foreign firm have a negative income effect on
Home, which is, however, only present for e > 0. In that case the two producers
are competitors and national subsidy policies affect global patterns of production,
of employment and of wages. In contrast, for e = 0 firms are monopolists in their
own market segments. Subsidies paid to the foreign firm then do not affect the
production decision of the domestic firm (and vice versa). Consequently, profits,
employment and wages and thus income in the home country are also not affected
by foreign wage subsidies.
The income spill-over effect can be decomposed in three parts. First, a wage
subsidy in Foreign shifts rents to the foreign firm and as a result profit income in
Home decreases:
∂Π
∂s∗
=
−8e(x+ x∗)
64− 20e2 + e4 < 0. (36)
Second, a wage subsidy paid in Foreign reduces labour income in Home. This is
due to both a fall in employment and in wages. By differentiating employment in
Home with respect to s∗, and taking also into account the wage responses by the
trade unions, we arrive at:
∂(x+ x∗)
∂s∗
= − 2e
4− e2 −
4
4− e2
∂w
∂s∗
+
2e
4− e2
∂w∗
∂s∗
(37)
= − 2e
4− e2
(
1− 12− e
2
16− e2
)
< 0. (38)
A wage subsidy in Foreign improves the competitiveness of the foreign firm and has
a direct negative effect on employment in the home country (first term on the right-
hand side of 37). In unionised labour markets this effect is mitigated as unions
at home and abroad adjust their wage demands accordingly. More specifically,
Home’s union moderates its wage demands (second term on the right-hand side
of 37) while the foreign union sets a higher wage rate (third term). Overall, the
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negative direct effect prevails and subsidies therefore have a negative effect on the
level of employment of the trading partner. As shown, wages in Home also decrease
and so does labour income:
∂LI
∂s∗
= (x+ x∗)
∂w
∂s∗
+ w
∂(x+ x∗)
∂s∗
=
−2e(x+ x∗)
16− e2 −
8ew
64− 20e2 + e4 < 0. (39)
Note that the effects of foreign wage subsidies on both domestic employment and
domestic wages (∂(x+x
∗)
∂s∗ and
∂w
∂s∗ ) decrease with e and are thus larger (in absolute
terms) when the two goods are close substitutes in consumption.
Finally, the negative effect of foreign wage subsidies on domestic employment
also implies that government expenditures on wage subsidies decline. This reduces
the tax burden for consumers and hence has a positive effect on home income:
∂GS
∂s∗
= s
∂(x+ x∗)
∂s∗
=
8es
64− 20e2 + e4 < 0. (40)
Nevertheless, by reducing both profit and labour income, a wage subsidy in Foreign
reduces net income in Home and thus decreases (ceteris paribus) the consumption
level of the numeraire good.11
Summarising these policy spill-overs we arrive at:
Proposition 1 A foreign wage subsidy has two spill-over effects on welfare in
Home. First, there is a positive effect on consumer surplus in the home country
and, second, there is a negative effect on net income in Home. The negative effect
on net income is only present for e > 0 and operates through both a reduction in
profit and in labour income.
Harmonisation vs. Policy Competition. Having discussed the various
effects of wage subsidies on welfare at home and abroad, we now calculate and
compare the optimal subsidies with and without policy cooperation. Consider first
the case of non-cooperative policy making. Each government decides independently
about the level of subsidies taking the choice of the other country as given. The
11Evaluating ∂LI∂s∗ +
∂Π
∂s∗ − ∂GS∂s∗ at the symmetric equilibrium s = s∗, we obtain
−8e((6−e2)(2a−t)−(4−(2+e)e)(b−s))
(4−e)2(2+e)2(2−e)(4+e) . The effect of s
∗ on net income in Home will be negative if (6− e2)(2a−
t)− (4− (2 + e)e)(b− s) > 0. Furthermore, output of the domestic firm in the symmetric equilibrium is
given by 2(2a−t)−4(b−s)(4−e)(2−e) . It is easily verified that nonnegative output levels then imply a negative effect
of s∗ on net income in Home.
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first-order condition of the government in Home then reads
∂W
∂s
=
∂CS
∂s
+
∂Π
∂s
+
∂LI
∂s
− ∂GS
∂s
= 0 (41)
and the optimal non-cooperative subsidy level, snoncoop, is given by
snoncoop = b+ 2aφ− tγ (42)
with φ = 40+6e−e
2(11+e−e2)
2(6+e)(4+e−e2) ≥ γ = 96−24e−(3−e)e
2(4−2e−e2)
4(2−e)(6+e)(4+e−e2) > 0. In Appendix A.1
we show that the second-order conditions for a maximum are fulfilled and that the
equilibrium is stable. Equilibrium wage, price and output levels associated with
(42) can be found in Appendix A.2.12
The optimal wage subsidy thus increases with a but decreases with t. An increase
in a shifts the demand function for the differentiated goods outward and ceteris
paribus increases production and thus employment. Even though wage subsidies are
then relatively expensive, they are also more effective in raising consumer surplus
and income.13 Likewise, closer economic integration between the two countries (a
lower t) increases competitive pressures in the two markets and thus total production
of the domestic firm (i.e. ∂x+x
∗
∂t < 0). The marginal effect of wage subsidies on profit
and labour income is then again larger but marginal costs of subsidising wages
increase as well. In contrast to an increase in a, closer economic integration has
an ambiguous effect on ∂CS∂s . While protection of the domestic market and, hence,
domestic sales x decline when trade barriers are dismantled, exports into the home
market y increase. Consumers then gain less from a given reduction in px but more
12With just one firm being present in each market, product market imperfections are severe in our
model. This is one reason for why governments have large incentive to subsidise wages. As a result, the
optimal wage subsidy in (42) has the unrealistic feature of being larger than the equilibrium wage itself.
When calculating the equilibrium solution, we implicitly assume that governments pay wage subsidies
only for ‘productive workers’ who are hired to produce output actually sold into the market. Thus, by
assumption, firms cannot hire workers and just stockpile their production (otherwise governments would
not pay such high subsidies in the first place). While the fact that s is larger than w in equilibrium
is clearly an undesirable model feature, it does not invalidate the message of the paper. One possible
remedy to the problem is to increase the social costs of wage subsidies, e.g. by requiring them to be
financed through distortionary taxes.
13Formally, we find
∂CS
∂s∂a
=
4(1 + e)
(4− e)2(2 + e)2 > 0,
∂Π
∂s∂a
=
16(8− e2)
(8 + 2e− e2)2(8− 2e− e2) > 0,
∂LI
∂s∂a
=
8(8− e2)
(4− e)2(8 + 6e+ e2) > 0,
∂GS
∂s∂a
=
4
8 + 2e− e2 > 0.
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from a reduction in py.14
Moreover, according to (42), the optimal wage subsidy increases one for one
with domestic unemployment benefits. In fact, from a welfare perspective, un-
employment benefits act as a negative wage subsidy in the model. The optimally
chosen levels of output, and thus consumer surplus and profit levels, depend only on
the difference between domestic subsidies and unemployment benefits (but not on
their absolute levels).15 Intuitively, wage subsidies decrease domestic labour costs,
while unemployment benefits, by improving the bargaining position of unions, in-
crease wages. Since wage subsidies and unemployment benefits in Foreign have an
analogous effect on foreign production, and output levels are strategic substitutes,
domestic production not only increases with s − b but also decreases with s∗ − b∗.
Moreover, total non-profit income net off lump-sum taxes w(x+x∗)−s(x+x∗), and
thus the remaining part of the welfare function, is also a function of s− b.16 Unem-
ployment benefits increase the wage rate (and thus the after-tax labour income) but
decrease employment. An increase in s, in contrast, exactly pulls into the opposite
direction by increasing employment but lowering the wage rate net off taxes. The
domestic government then effectively chooses the optimal level of s − b taking the
unemployment benefit as given.
The spill-overs described before provide a rational for policy coordination. Since
governments do not take costs and benefits for the foreign country into consideration,
the non-cooperative solution in (42) is generally not optimal from a global point of
view. We thus compare the non-cooperative solution to a cooperative equilibrium.
Motivated by the literature on tax competition, we first assume that governments
14Formally, we find
∂Π
∂s∂t
=
−8(8− e2)
(8 + 2e− e2)2(8− 2e− e2) < 0,
∂LI
∂s∂t
=
−4(8− e2)
(4− e)2(8 + 6e+ e2) < 0,
∂GS
∂s∂t
=
−2
8 + 2e− e2 > 0,
∂CS
∂s∂t
=
32− 40e− e2(20− 6e− (3− e)e2)
(4− e)2(4 + e)(4− e2)2 ,
where the last expression is positive (negative) for a sufficiently small (large) e.
15By plugging the wages set by the unions into the corresponding output expressions for the domestic
firm, we obtain
x =
4(4 + e)(2− e)a+ (16 + 20e− e3)t+ (32− 4e2)(s− b)− 8e(s∗ − b∗)
2(64− 20e2 + e4) ,
x∗ =
4(4 + e)(2− e)a− (4 + e)(12− e2)t+ (32− 4e2)(s− b)− 8e(s∗ − b∗)
2(64− 20e2 + e4) .
Analogous expressions exist for the firm located in Foreign.
16Using equation (26), w − s can be written as (4+e)(2−e)(2a−t)−16(s−b)−4e(s∗−b∗)2(16−e2) .
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agree to harmonise the level of wage subsidies across countries. This approach seems
natural if countries are fully symmetric. It will, however, entail costs if countries
differ in terms of their labour market institutions. As an extension, we thus also
consider an optimal cooperation policy (see Section 6.1).
Cooperating governments set the common subsidy level s so as to maximise
aggregate welfare W +W ∗ = (CS+CS∗) + (Π + Π∗) + (LI +LI∗)− (GS−GS∗) +
(Z+Z∗). Solving the resulting first-order condition then yields the common welfare-
maximising subsidy level under policy harmonisation
scoop1 = b+
(6− e2)(2a− t)
4(1 + e)
, (43)
where the subscript coop1 indicates that we consider cooperation with just one
instrument (namely the common harmonised wage subsidy) at hand. The associated
equilibrium wages, prices and output levels can again be found in the Appendix.
The difference between the optimal subsidy under policy cooperation and non-
cooperation is given by
scoop1 − snoncoop = (4− e)
2(1− e)(2 + e)2((2− e)2a− 3t)
4(2− e)(1 + e)(6 + e)(4 + e− e2) (44)
and the welfare gain from policy harmonisation can be written as:
(Wcoop1 +W ∗coop1)− (Wnoncoop +W ∗noncoop) =
(4− e)2(1− e)2(2 + e)2((2− e)2a− 3t)2
2(2− e)2(1 + e)(6 + e)2(4 + e− e2)2 . (45)
By inspecting the differences in (44) and (45), we arrive at
Proposition 2 If governments maximise social welfare and countries are symmet-
ric, the optimal subsidy level under policy harmonisation will be strictly higher than
under non-cooperation for e = [0, 1[ and identical for e = 1. Furthermore, the dif-
ference between the subsidy level with and without policy cooperation and the welfare
gain from cooperation are both strictly decreasing in e.
The proof of Proposition 2 is relegated to the Appendix.
Intuitively, Proposition 2 can be explained as follows: While the positive spill-
over effect on consumer surplus calls for a higher cooperative subsidy, the negative
income spill-over pulls into the opposite direction. As long as the two goods are
not fully homogeneous, the positive spill-over effect on consumer surplus dominates
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and cooperating governments choose a higher subsidy level than non-cooperating
governments do. In fact, the gap between the subsidy levels in the cooperative and
the non-cooperative equilibrium increases with the degree of product differentiation.
To grasp the intuition behind the result, it is useful to reconsider the extreme case of
e = 0. Recall that the two firms are then monopolies in their market segments and a
wage subsidy paid to one firm does not affect production of the other. Employment
and wages in Home are also not affected by wage subsidies in Foreign. The negative
income spill-over effect then ceases to exist and cooperating governments are left
with the positive spill-over effect on consumer surplus:
∂W
∂s∗
∣∣∣∣
e=0
=
∂CS
∂s∗
∣∣∣∣
e=0
+
∂Π
∂s∗
∣∣∣∣
e=0
+
∂LI
∂s∗
∣∣∣∣
e=0
− ∂GS
∂s∗
∣∣∣∣
e=0
=
∂CS
∂s∗
∣∣∣∣
e=0
> 0. (46)
Consequently, cooperating governments have an incentive to agree on a relatively
large wage subsidy (compared to the non-cooperative solution). Naturally, large
differences between scoop1 and snoncoop also imply large welfare gains from policy
harmonisation.
5.2 Asymmetric Labour Market Institutions
Differences in national institutions (or different preferences about institutional fea-
tures) are often seen as the main culprit why cooperation, though theoretically
appealing, rarely works in practice. In this section we thus allow for asymmetric
labour market institutions, namely for cross-country differences in the level of un-
employment benefits, and discuss how these asymmetries alter our results derived
before. Without loss of generality, we assume that b > b∗. This may, for instance,
replicate institutional differences in the unemployment benefits system across EU
member states such as Sweden and the UK.
We find that policy harmonisation will face two problems if countries differ in
the generosity of their unemployment benefits: First, policy harmonisation reduces
the capability of governments to adopt their policies to country-specific institutions.
And second, even if policy harmonisation still increases aggregate welfare, it can run
into fierce political opposition because benefits and costs are unevenly distributed
between cooperating countries. Surprisingly, a harmonisation of wage subsidies, in
fact, increases cross-country differences in welfare levels.
We first derive the non-cooperative equilibrium. Governments set wage subsidies
to maximise national welfare taking the subsidy choice of the trading partner as
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given. To simplify expressions, we choose a specific value of e and assume that the
two products are completely unrelated (i.e. e = 0). The results presented in the
following are, in a qualitative sense, not affected by the specific choice of e as long
as e is smaller than one (and thus potential gains from cooperation exist).17 For
e = 0 the non-cooperative subsidy levels are given by:
snoncoop = b+
5
3
a− 1
2
t, s∗noncoop = b
∗ +
5
3
a− 1
2
t. (47)
The optimal subsidy set by each government thus increases with the respective
domestic level of unemployment benefits but is unrelated to the benefits paid by the
trading partner. As in the case of symmetric labour markets, subsidies increase in
a but decrease in t.
The one-to-one relation between subsidies and unemployment benefits imply that
both countries choose the same difference s− b = s∗ − b∗. Welfare in turn depends
only on this difference but not on the absolute levels of s and b. Therefore, the non-
cooperative equilibrium levels of welfare are independent of the country-specific and
exogenously given unemployment benefits:
Wnoncoop − Z = W ∗noncoop − Z∗ =
8a2
9
− 5at
6
+
3t2
8
. (48)
Wage subsidies allow each government to fully offset the welfare effects of un-
employment benefits. Apart from the exogenous endowment of non-labour assets,
welfare levels in the two countries are thus exactly identical in the non-cooperative
equilibrium. Clearly, this result should not be taken too literally since it hinges on a
number of assumptions, and in particular on the capability of governments to raise
non-distortionary (lump-sum) taxes. In fact, for b > b∗ Home is a high-wage, high-
tax country while both taxes and wages are relatively low in Foreign. The results
in (47) and (48) mainly serve as a benchmark scenario, to which we now compare
welfare under policy harmonisation.
If governments agree to harmonise their labour market policies, they choose a
common subsidy level s = s∗ to maximise joint welfare. The resulting optimal
subsidy level for e = 0 reads:
scoop1 =
b+ b∗
2
+
3(2a− t)
2
. (49)
When comparing subsidy levels with and without policy coordination, two main
differences are striking. First, a harmonisation of wage subsidies has the distinctive
17For e = 1 the cooperative and the non-cooperative solution are again identical in welfare terms.
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disadvantage that labour market policies can no longer be targeted to the benefit
system of each country. In fact, the common subsidy depends on the cross-country
average of the two unemployment benefit levels. Second, with policy coordination
the two governments account for spill-over effects of wage subsidies. Since the overall
spill-over effect on welfare is positive, the common subsidy level under cooperation
is strictly higher than the average of the two non-cooperative subsidy levels.18 It
is the interplay of these two forces - the cost of not being able to tailor the wage
subsidy to the characteristics of the domestic labour market and the general benefit
of internalising the spill-over effects of wage subsidies - that is at the heart of any
cost and benefit analysis of policy harmonisation in the presence of asymmetric
labour markets.
If cooperating governments choose a common subsidy level, wage subsidies paid
in one country not only reflect domestic but also foreign labour market institutions.
Therefore, cross-country differences in the unemployment benefit systems are no
longer inconsequential for domestic welfare. In equilibrium, welfare levels are given
by:
Wcoop1 − Z = a2 + a(b− b
∗ − 4t)
4
− (b− b
∗ − 2t)(b− b∗ + 14t)
64
, (50)
W ∗coop1 − Z∗ = a2 +
a(b∗ − b− 4t)
4
− (b
∗ − b− 2t)(b∗ − b+ 14t)
64
. (51)
Inspecting the expressions (50) and (51) and comparing them to the results derived
for the case of non-cooperating governments, we arrive at
Proposition 3 i. Policy harmonisation increases (decreases) joint welfare of
the two countries if and only if b−b∗ < (>)2(4a−3t)3 . Furthermore, the aggregate
welfare gain from cooperation is strictly decreasing in b− b∗.
ii. Policy harmonisation increases (decreases) welfare in Home if and only if
b − b∗ < (>)2λ(4a−3t)3 with λ =
√
10 + 3 > 1. For sufficiently small (large)
differences between b and b∗, Wcoop1 −Wnoncoop is increasing (decreasing) in
b− b∗.
iii. Policy harmonisation increases (decreases) welfare in Foreign if and only if
b− b∗ < (>)2λ∗(4a−3t)3 with λ∗ =
√
10− 3 < 1. Moreover, W ∗coop1−W ∗noncoop is
strictly decreasing in b− b∗.
18Subtracting 1/2(snoncoop + s∗noncoop) from scoop1 gives 4/3a − t. Given our assumption of positive
intra-industry trade and the fact that x and y equal (4a− 3t)/6 > 0 in the non-cooperative equilibrium,
the common subsidy level under cooperation is higher than the average of the two non-cooperative subsidy
levels.
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iv. With policy coordination welfare net of the exogenous endowment of non-labor
assets is strictly larger in Home than in Foreign, i.e. Wcoop1−Z > W ∗coop1−Z∗.
The proof of Proposition 3 is relegated to the Appendix.
The proposition demonstrates that even with cross-country differences in labour
market institutions harmonising subsidies can raise joint welfare of the two countries
- as long as the institutions in place are not too different. The aggregate welfare gain
successively decreases and eventually turns negative as cross-country differences in
labour market institutions become more important. However, this may not be the
case for each country on its own. In fact, cross-country differences in the benefit
systems strictly diminish the welfare gain from policy harmonisation for Foreign
(that pays the relatively low unemployment benefit level of b∗ < b). In contrast,
for Home the gain from coordination even increases with b − b∗ provided that the
difference does not exceed a certain threshold level. Moreover, in the cooperative
equilibrium welfare in Home, the country with a more generous unemployment
benefit system, strictly exceeds welfare in Foreign. Harmonising wage subsidies
therefore does not equalise welfare across countries but even drives a wedge between
welfare levels in Home and in Foreign.
To clarify these results, consider the country-specific differences between the
subsidy paid with and without policy cooperation:
scoop1 − snoncoop = 4a− 3t3 −
b− b∗
2
, (52)
s∗coop1 − s∗noncoop =
4a− 3t
3
+
b− b∗
2
. (53)
If countries do not engage in policy competition but choose a common subsidy
level, they will target the average unemployment benefit (b + b∗)/2 rather than
their country-specific benefit levels b and b∗. The average is too low relative to the
generous benefits in Home but too high relative to the meager benefits in Foreign
(i.e. b > (b + b∗)/2 > b∗). It then follows that an increase in b − b∗ decreases
scoop1−snoncoop but increases s∗coop1−s∗noncoop. Since on average the common subsidy
level is higher than the non-cooperative choices, larger cross-country differences push
the harmonised subsidy closer to snoncoop (as long as b− b∗ is not getting too large)
but further away from s∗noncoop. As the non-cooperative subsidy levels represent the
best response of a country to the subsidy set by its trading partner, the gain from
policy harmonisation then increases in Home but decreases in Foreign. Moreover,
given the positive spill-over effect associated with wage subsidies, Home does not
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only benefit from scoop1 approaching snoncoop but also from the increase in s∗coop1
relative to s∗noncoop. Only for large differences between b and b∗, when scoop1 already
falls short of snoncoop, further increases in b− b∗ push scoop1 away from snoncoop and
eventually decrease Home’s benefits from policy harmonisation.
Foreign, in contrast, is punished twice by increases in b−b∗. Not only does its own
wage subsidy diverges more and more from s∗noncoop, it also benefits less and less from
Home paying a higher subsidy under harmonisation than under non-cooperation.
For large b− b∗ Foreign even suffers from scoop1 falling short of snoncoop.19
The differential effect on welfare in Home and Foreign induces a potential en-
forceability problem associated with policy cooperation under labour market asym-
metries. According to Proposition 3 there exists a range of parameter values,
2λ(4a−3t)
3 < b − b∗ < 2(4a−3t)3 , for which policy harmonisation increases joint wel-
fare of the two countries but decreases welfare in Foreign. The low-benefit country
then has an incentive to blockade any policy initiative to harmonise labour market
policies. Our analysis thus provides a rationale for why labour market policies are
still mostly in national hands even though policy harmonisation might be beneficial
from a bird’s eye perspective.
6 Extensions
In this subsection, we consider two extensions to our benchmark model. We first
study an optimal cooperation policy that allows cooperating governments to choose
country-specific subsidy levels. We then analyse how our main findings would change
if governments targeted employment rather than welfare.
6.1 Optimal Cooperative Wage Subsidies
So far, we have interpreted policy cooperation as a harmonisation of wage subsidies.
In fact, the public debate about international policy coordination often focuses on
the question of whether national policies should be leveled across national borders.
However, policy harmonisation reduces the capability of governments to adapt their
policies to country-specific institutions as governments are left with only one policy
instrument at hand. An optimal cooperative policy, in contrast, allows subsidy levels
to differ across countries. With asymmetric labour market institutions, aggregate
19While an increase in b− b∗ diminishes the aggregate gains from cooperation for Foreign, firm profits
are positively affected. Foreign firms benefit both from relatively high wage subsidies (compared to the
low unemployment benefits) and the comparably low subsidies paid to their competitors.
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welfare must be higher if policy makers have two rather than one instruments at
their disposition. However, as we illustrate in the following, the high-benefit country
might nevertheless prefer a harmonisation policy.
Optimal policy cooperation between Home and Foreign requires that country-
specific subsidy levels s and s∗ are chosen to maximise aggregate welfare W+W ∗. To
simplify expressions - and to facilitate comparison with the results derived in Section
5.2 - we again focus on the case of unrelated products (i.e. e = 0). We also continue
to assume that Home pays higher unemployment benefits than Foreign i.e. b >
b∗. Solving the first-order conditions yields the optimal cooperative subsidy levels
(marked with the subscript coop2 for a cooperation strategy with two instruments):20
scoop2 = b+
3(2a− t)
2
, s∗coop2 = b
∗ +
3(2a− t)
2
. (54)
The optimal cooperative solution combines the benefits of both policy competi-
tion and subsidy harmonisation. On the one hand, with two instruments at hand
governments target country-specific institutions (as they do under policy compe-
tition) and national wage subsidies depend on local unemployment benefits only.
On the other hand, cooperating governments account for the spill-over effects of
wage subsidies. In fact, the average of scoop2 and s∗coop2 exactly equals the optimal
harmonised subsidy level scoop1.
The optimal subsidies in (54) increase one to one with national unemployment
benefits. Therefore, the difference between s and b is identical in Home and Foreign
and welfare levels coincide as well:
Wcoop2 − Z = W ∗coop2 − Z∗ = a2 − at+
7t2
16
. (55)
Policy cooperation with two instruments at hand always increases aggregate wel-
fare W + W ∗ relative to both the equilibrium with policy competition and policy
harmonisation. Since welfare levels in Home and Foreign are identical, as they are
under policy competition, it furthermore follows that each country on its own also
prefers optimal policy cooperation to policy competition. The high-benefit country,
however, might still lobby for policy harmonisation, as we demonstrate in
Proposition 4 i. Optimal policy cooperation decreases (increases) welfare in
Home relative to the equilibrium under policy harmonisation iff b − b∗ < (>
)4(4a− 3t).
20The second-order condition for a maximum are fulfilled as ∂
2(W+W∗)
∂2s =
∂2(W+W∗)
∂2s∗ = − 18 .
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ii. Optimal policy cooperation increases welfare in Foreign relative to the equilib-
rium under policy harmonisation.
The proof of Proposition 4 is relegated to the Appendix.
Even though policy-makers give up a policy instrument by harmonising subsidy
levels, Home will be best off with policy harmonisation if cross-country differences
are sufficiently small. Foreign, in contrast, is always better off when cooperating
countries do not coordinate on a common subsidy but choose country-specific sub-
sidy levels.
The reason is as follows. If countries have to choose a common subsidy level, they
will target the average unemployment benefit (b + b∗)/2. The harmonised subsidy
level is thus lower in the high-benefit country but higher in the low-benefit country
(relative to the optimal cooperative and country-specific subsidies). Positive spill-
over effects imply that Home benefits from higher subsidy levels paid in Foreign.
In addition, for sufficiently small differences in the unemployment benefit systems,
the difference between scoop1 and snoncoop is smaller (in absolute terms) than the
difference between scoop2 and snoncoop. Subtracting the two terms yields:
|scoop2 − snoncoop| − |scoop1 − snoncoop| =
∣∣∣∣4a− 3t3
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣4a− 3t3 − b− b∗2
∣∣∣∣ . (56)
For b− b∗ < 4(4a−3t)/3, the harmonised subsidy scoop1 is closer to Home’s optimal
unilateral choice snoncoop than is the optimal cooperative subsidy scoop2. Since the
non-cooperative subsidy represents the best response of a country to the subsidy set
by its trading partner, this is again in the interest of Home.
From the perspective of Foreign, in contrast, policy harmonisation only carries
disadvantages relative to the optimal cooperative policy. Not only does Home pay
relatively low wage subsidies. Policy harmonisation also pushes the subsidy level
further away from Foreign’s non-cooperative choice than optimal policy coordination
does:
∣∣s∗coop2 − s∗noncoop∣∣− ∣∣s∗coop1 − s∗noncoop∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣4a− 3t3
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣4a− 3t3 + b− b∗2
∣∣∣∣
= −b− b
∗
2
< 0. (57)
It then follows that Foreign strictly prefers optimal policy cooperation over policy
harmonisation.
To sum up: The optimal cooperative policy accounts for the spill-over effects
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of national wage subsidies while allowing policy-makers to target country-specific
labour market institutions. Aggregate welfare thus increases unambiguously com-
pared to both policy competition and policy harmonisation. But even if policy
cooperation could indeed be designed optimally in the real world, countries can
still disagree about which policy to implement. In fact, the high-benefit country
may prefer the (globally suboptimal) harmonisation policy that chooses a common
subsidy level for both countries.
6.2 Optimal Wage Subsidies under an Employment Tar-
get
Up to this point, we have analysed welfare maximising wage subsidies. Even though
a welfare target is widely used in academic policy analysis, governments may in
reality pursue different policy goals. In fact, the prime motive for subsidising wages
is usually to stimulate employment (while adhering to some budget constraint). In
this subsection, we therefore analyse a political reform where governments maximise
the value of employment (V E) and compare the results to those derived for a welfare
maximising policy.
Governments are assumed to value each additional job at the difference between
the unemployment benefit saved by the state and the subsidy paid:21
V E = (b− s)L, V E∗ = (b∗ − s∗)L∗. (58)
Government then set wage subsidies such that, at the margin, the cost of creating an
additional job equals the unemployment benefit saved by the state. Note that our
employment target function is particularly conservative as governments only sub-
sidise employment if the additionally created job can be financed by the savings in
unemployment benefits for this otherwise unemployed new employee. Consequently,
governments implicitly minimise their overall expenditures on unemployment ben-
efits and subsidies.
21Clearly, this assumption is to a certain degree arbitrary. However, the main purpose of the subsection
is not to give an accurate description of governments’ behaviour. We rather want to illustrate that results
can depend on the specific policy target chosen. One could, of course, envisage different employment target
functions. For instance, the government could value an additional job by its market wage rather than by
the unemployment benefit saved. Non-standard target functions have already been used in the literature
on wage and hiring subsidies. For example, Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) maximise social welfare
of workers subject to non-workers receiving at least a minimum amount of utility. Orszag and Snower
(2003) employ a welfare objective such that the number of (long-term) unemployed is minimised and
welfare of low-wage earners is maximised.
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Consider first the effect of a domestic wage subsidy on the domestic government
target. For the sake of brevity we focus on the case of symmetric countries only.22
Given the symmetry of the model, we again restrict our analysis to the home country.
Differentiating the employment target with respect to the subsidy level yields:
∂V E
∂s
=
∂L
∂s
(b− s)− L, (59)
where L = (x+ x∗) and ∂L∂s =
4(8−e2)
64−20e2+e4 > 0.
The government faces the same marginal costs as under welfare targeting. In
particular, a marginal increase in the subsidy level boosts government’s expenditure
on wage subsidies. Some of that additional government expenditure is paid for
new workers joining the labour force (∂L∂s s), the rest is again a deadweight loss as
the higher subsidy also has to be paid for those workers already in employment
(L). But higher wage subsidies, by reducing unemployment, also lower government
expenditures on unemployment benefits and thus increase the value of employment
(∂L∂s b). Importantly, a government that targets employment rather than welfare does
only account for a subset of the policy effects discussed in Section 5.1. In particular,
governments ignore the positive effect of wage subsidies on consumer surplus and
gross income.
In addition to the effect of the domestic subsidy on the home economy, a wage
subsidy also affects (the value of) employment abroad. Differentiating the domestic
target function with respect to the level of foreign wage subsidies yields:
∂V E
∂s∗
=
∂L
∂s∗
(b− s), (60)
where
∂L
∂s∗
= − 2e
4− e2
(
1− 12− e
2
16− e2
)
< 0. (61)
As discussed before, the wage subsidy abroad has a negative spill-over effect on em-
ployment in the home economy. Under an employment target the marginal effect
on employment is valued at b− s, the net cost to the state of any worker addition-
ally unemployed. Neither the positive consumer surplus spill-over nor the negative
income spill-over effect appears in (60).
In the following, we derive the optimal wage subsidy with and without policy
coordination. First, let us assume that governments choose the optimal subsidy
22A detailed discussion for the case of asymmetric institutions can be obtained from the authors upon
request
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unilaterally by maximising their domestic target functions. The optimal subsidy
can then be written as:
sV Enoncoop = s
V E∗
noncoop = b−
(8− 2e− e2)(2a− t)
4(8− e− e2) , (62)
where we use the superscript V E to distinguish the solution from the welfare-
maximising choice. We show in Appendix D.1 that the second-order conditions
for a maximum are fulfilled and that the equilibrium is stable.
The optimal subsidy in equilibrium is thus increasing in b and t but decreasing
in a. Higher unemployment benefits not only aggravate the unemployment problem
by increasing the reservation wage of workers but also increase the per-capita costs
of the unemployed to the state. In response, governments set higher subsidy levels.
Lower trading costs, in contrast, intensify competition in the product market and
thus increase employment. The same is true for increases in a that shift out the
demand function for the differentiated goods X and Y . Additional wage subsidies
then face high deadweight costs and governments choose lower wage subsidies. The
qualitative effects of changes in a and t on the wage subsidy chosen by the gov-
ernment are thus exactly reversed compared to the welfare maximising solution.
Finally, higher degrees of product differentiation decrease the optimal subsidy.23
A decrease in e not only increases market demand and employment (and thus the
costs of wage subsidies). It also reduces the negative employment spill-over effect on
the trading partner and renders a wage subsidy less efficient in increasing domestic
employment.
Given the negative employment spill-over effect associated with wage subsidies,
there is room for policy coordination. With symmetric labour markets governments
do not lose from having only one instrument at hand and we thus consider only
the case of policy harmonisation. If governments set a common subsidy level to
maximise their joint policy target V E+V E∗ = (b−s)L+(b−s)L∗, the corresponding
first-order condition will read:
∂V E + V E∗
∂s
=
∂(L+ L∗)
∂s
(b− s)− (L+ L∗) = 0. (63)
Under policy harmonisation the wage subsidy is chosen such that, at the margin,
the cost for creating an additional job in the union of both countries equals the
unemployment benefit saved by the governments. Such a policy then minimises
the combined expenditures of the two states for unemployment benefits and wage
23Formally, we find ∂s
V E
noncoop
∂e =
(8+e2)(2a−t)
4(8−e−e2)2 > 0.
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subsidies.
Solving the maximisation problem yields the following optimal subsidy level
under policy cooperation:
sV Ecoop1 = b−
2a− t
4
. (64)
While the wage subsidy under cooperation still increases with b and decreases with
2a−t, it is independent of e. If goods are close substitutes, the negative employment
spill-over effect will be high and thus the effect of an increase in s on L + L∗
comparably low.24 This effect balances the higher incentives for subsidising wages
that result from the comparably low employment level associated with a low level
of product differentiation.
Given that wage subsidies have a negative employment effect on the trading part-
ner, the subsidy under policy harmonisation is lower than under policy competition
(for e > 0):
sV Ecoop1 − sV Enoncoop =
−e(2a− t)
4(8− e− e2) < 0. (65)
Cooperation internalises the negative employment spill-over effect and increases the
equilibrium value of the policy target function in both countries.
Both under policy coordination and non-coordination, the welfare maximising
government analysed in the previous section chooses a higher wage subsidy than
a government pursuing an employment target. If governments target the value
of employment, they will ignore the positive effect of wage subsidies on consumer
surplus and gross income. Cooperation then decreases rather than increases the
subsidy level. Our analysis therefore illustrates that the effects of international
policy coordination may depend strongly on the policy goals pursued by national
governments.
We can now summarise the main findings of this section in
Proposition 5 1. If countries are symmetric and governments maximise em-
ployment until the cost of creating a new job - at the margin - equals the un-
employment benefit the government has to pay otherwise, wage subsidies create
a negative employment spill-over effect. This effect decreases in the level of
product differentiation (i.e. increases with e). The optimal subsidy level under
policy harmonisation is then strictly lower than under policy competition for
e =]0, 1] and identical for e = 0.
2. The welfare maximising subsidy levels are always higher than the subsidy levels
governments choose under the employment target. More specifically, we find
24 ∂(L+L
∗)
∂s∂e =
−16(1−e)
(4−e)2(2+e)2 < 0 for 0 ≤ e < 1.
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scoop1 > snoncoop > s
V E
noncoop > s
V E
coop1.
7 Conclusion
Wage subsidies are an increasingly popular policy tool to foster labour demand and
fight unemployment without creating working poverty. When product markets are
global, however, such labour market policies entail important spill-over effects, a
fact widely ignored by the academic literature. In this paper, we analyse the effects
of wage subsidies in an international duopoly model with unionised labour markets
and discuss the costs and benefits from international policy coordination both for
the case of symmetric and asymmetric labour market institutions.
We find that wage subsidies paid in one country have several effects - both for the
domestic country but also for the trading partner. First, wage subsidies affect the
global patterns of wages and employment, increasing labour income at home while
decreasing it abroad. Second, wage subsidies increase profits of the domestic firm at
the expense of the foreign competitor. Third, consumers at home and abroad benefit
from wages subsidies as they reduce marginal production cost and thus consumer
prices. The relative strength of these effects depends crucially on the degree of
product differentiation.
Given the spill-over effects identified in our analysis, there is room for coor-
dinating labour market policies internationally. In fact, coordinative action has
been discussed in the policy arena, especially within the European Union, but little
progress has been made in its implementation. We show that policy harmonisa-
tion can run into severe problems when national labour market institutions differ,
as they do in practice. Not only does harmonisation reduce the capability of gov-
ernments to adopt their policies to country-specific institutions. The benefits and
costs are also unevenly distributed between cooperating countries. International
policy harmonisation may then be difficult to enforce politically, even if it increases
aggregate welfare. Thus, in practice, the harmonisation of labour market policies
seems realistic only for countries with sufficiently similar labour market institutions,
a result that also may help to explain the slow speed at which coordination within
the European Union has progressed so far.
An optimal cooperative policy that allows subsidy levels to differ across countries
does not restrict the capability of cooperating governments to account for country-
specific institutions. It thus overcomes the key problem associated with policy har-
monisation. Though theoretically appealing, an optimal cooperative policy might
be very difficult to implement in reality since it requires cross-country coordination
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on more than just one instrument. And even if policy cooperation could indeed be
designed optimally, countries can still disagree about which cooperation policy to
implement. In fact, our analysis suggests that a subset of countries could lobby for
policy harmonisation although a common subsidy does not maximise overall welfare.
Our analysis lends itself to a number of extensions. In particular, we have
abstracted from labour and capital mobility. While in the past labour mobility
within the European Union, a prime candidate for policy coordination, has indeed
been rather low, this may change as the European unification process proceeds.
Since labour market policies could arguably also affect migration decisions, a model
with mobile workers may detect additional spill-overs not captured in our simple
framework. Likewise, labour market policies might also affect the location decision
of firms, a fact also not captured in our model setup. Finally, wage subsidies are
generally regarded as a mean to fight unemployment among low-skilled workers.
Hence, allowing for heterogeneous labour could enrich the predictions of the model.
We consider these extensions as promising paths for future research.
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A Appendix to Section 5.1
A.1 Reaction Functions and Second-Order Conditions
If governments choose the level of wage subsidies non-cooperatively, the reaction
function s(s∗) for Home will read:
s(s∗) =
(4 + e)(2− e)(6 + e)(4 + (1− e)e)b
192− 84e2 + 7e4 −
e(32− 8e2 + e4)s∗
192− 84e2 + 7e4
+
(4 + e)(2− e)(40 + 6e− e2(11 + (1− e)e))a
192− 84e2 + 7e4
−(384− (2− e)e
2(36 + 4e− e2(5 + e))t
4(192− 84e2 + 7e4) . (66)
The system of reaction functions is stable if
∣∣ ∂s
∂s∗
∣∣ = e(32−8e2+e4)s∗
192−84e2+7e4 < 1. This condi-
tion is fulfilled for the relevant parameter range of e (i.e. for 0 ≤ e ≤ 1). Moreover,
the second-order condition is given by:
∂2W
∂2s
=
−4(192− 84e2 + 7e4)
(64− 20e2 + e4)2 < 0. (67)
If, in contrast, the two governments agree to harmonise their wage subsidies, the
second-order condition will be given by:
∂2(W +W ∗)
∂2s
=
−16(1 + e)
(4− e)2(2 + e)2 < 0. (68)
A.2 Output, Prices and Wages in Equilibrium
xnoncoop = y∗noncoop =
(2− e)(8− e2)2a+ (10e− (2 + e)e2)t
(6 + e)(2− e)(4 + e− e2) ,
x∗noncoop = ynoncoop =
(8− e2)((2− e)2a− 3t)
(6 + e)(2− e)(4 + e− e2) ,
px,noncoop = p∗y,noncoop =
(4 + e)(2− e)(1− e)(2 + e)a+ 2e(7 + e− e2)t
(6 + e)(2− e)(4 + e− e2) ,
p∗x,noncoop = py,noncoop =
(4 + e)(2− e)(1− e)(2 + e)a+ (24− 13e2 + e3(2 + e))t
(6 + e)(2− e)(4 + e− e2) ,
wnoncoop = w∗noncoop = b+
(64− 24e2 + 2e4)2a− (48 + 4e− e2(3− e)(4 + e))t
4(6 + e)(4 + e− e2) ,
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xcoop1 = y∗coop1 =
(2− e)2a+ (1− 2e)t
2(2− e)(1 + e) , x
∗
coop1 = ycoop1 =
(2− e)2a− 3t
2(2− e)(1 + e) ,
px,coop = p∗y,coop =
t
2(2− e) , p
∗
x,coop = py,coop =
(3− 2e)t
2(2− e) ,
wcoop1 = w∗coop1 = b+
(2a− t)(4− e2)
4(1 + e)
.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Notice first that for our assumption of positive levels of intra-industry trade to hold
in equilibrium, trading costs t have to be lower than (2−e)2a3 (see Appendix A.2). It
then follows directly from (44) that scoop1 − snoncoop is positive for 0 ≤ e < 1 and
zero for e = 0.
Moreover, differentiating scoop1 − snoncoop with respect to e yields:
∂(scoop1 − snoncoop)
∂e
=
−(4− e)(2 + e)(2a(2− e)κ1 − 3tκ2)
4(2− e)2(1 + e)2(6 + e)2(4 + e− e2)2 ,
where κ1 = (2 − e)(368 + 252e − 66e2 − 64e3 + e4(14e + e2 − 1)) and κ2 = 544 +
8e − 148e2 + e3(94 + 15e − 9e3). It then follows from κ1 ≥ κ2 for e ∈ [0, 1] and
(2− e)2a > 3t that scoop1 − snoncoop is strictly decreasing in e.
Finally, differentiating the welfare gain from cooperation with respect to e yields:
∂(Wcoop1 +W ∗coop1 −Wnoncoop −W ∗noncoop)
∂e
=
−(4− e)(1− e)(2 + e)(2a(2− e)− 3t)(2a(2− e)λ1 − 3tλ2)
2(2− e)3(1 + e)2(6 + e)3(4 + e− e2)3
with λ1 = (2 − e)(640 + 512e − 116e2 − 72e3 + 31e4 + 14e5 − e6) and λ2 = 896 +
128e − 272e2 + 284e3 + 40e4 − 61e5 − 10e6 + 3e7. It then follows from λ1 ≥ λ2 for
e ∈ [0, 1] and (2− e)2a > 3t that the welfare gain from cooperation is decreasing in
e.
B Appendix to Section 5.2
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Notice first that in the non-cooperative equilibrium exports from Home to Foreign
and vice versa are given by x = y = 4a−3t6 . For our assumption of positive intra-
industry trade to hold in equilibrium, trading costs t thus have to be lower than
4/3a. Recall further that b − b∗ is positive by assumption. We can now consider
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each part of Proposition 3 in turn:
i. Calculating the aggregate welfare gain from policy harmonisation ∆(W +
W ∗) = Wcoop1 +W ∗coop1 − (Wnoncoop +W ∗noncoop) yields:
∆(W +W ∗) =
(8a− 6t)2 − 9(b− b∗)2
288
.
Next, observe that
lim
b−b∗→0
∆(W +W ∗) =
(8a− 6t)2
288
> 0, lim
b−b∗→∞
∆(W +W ∗) = −∞,
and
∂∆(W +W ∗)
∂(b− b∗) =
−(b− b∗)
16
< 0.
It then follows that there exist a threshold b′ such that the aggregate welfare
gain from policy harmonisation is positive (negative) iff b− b∗ < (>) b′. It is
easily verified that the threshold equals 2(4a−3t)3 .
ii. Calculating Home’s welfare gain from policy harmonisation ∆W = Wcoop1 −
Wnoncoop yields:
∆W =
(8a− 6t)2 − 9(b− b∗)2 + 36(4a− 3t)(b− b∗)
576
.
Next, observe that
lim
b−b∗→0
∆W =
(8a− 6t)2
576
> 0, lim
b−b∗→∞
∆W = −∞,
and
∂∆W
∂(b− b∗) =
−(b− b∗) + 2(4a− 3t)
32
,
∂2∆W
∂2(b− b∗) = −
1
32
.
Home’s gain from policy harmonisation is thus strictly positive as b − b∗ ap-
proaches zero but negative for large cross-country differences in the unemploy-
ment benefit system. We furthermore see that Wcoop1−Wnoncoop first increases
in b − b∗, reaches a maximum at b − b∗ = 8a − 6t and decreases thereafter.
It then follows that there exist a threshold b′′ such that the welfare gain from
policy harmonisation in Home is positive (negative) iff b − b∗ < (>) b′′. It is
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easily verified that the threshold equals (
√
10 + 3)2(4a−3t)3 .
iii. Calculating Foreign’s welfare gain from policy harmonisation ∆W ∗ = W ∗coop1−
W ∗noncoop yields:
∆W ∗ =
(8a− 6t)2 − 9(b− b∗)2 − 36(4a− 3t)(b− b∗)
576
.
Next, observe that
lim
b−b∗→0
∆W ∗ =
(8a− 6t)2
576
> 0, lim
b−b∗→∞
∆W ∗ = −∞,
and
∂∆W ∗
∂(b− b∗) =
−(b− b∗)− 2(4a− 3t)
32
< 0.
It then follows that there exist a threshold b′′′ such that the welfare gain from
policy harmonisation in Foreign is positive (negative) iff b− b∗ < (>) b′′′. It is
easily verified that the threshold equals (
√
10− 3)2(4a−3t)3 .
iv. Subtracting W ∗coop1 − Z from Wcoop1 − Z∗ gives
(b− b∗)(4a− 3t)
8
,
which is always positive for b > b∗.
C Appendix to Section 6.1
C.1 Proof of Proposition 4
Notice first that in the (optimal) cooperative equilibrium exports from Home to
Foreign and vice versa are given by x = y = 4a−3t4 . For our assumption of positive
intra-industry trade to hold in equilibrium, trading costs t thus have to be lower
than 4/3a. Recall further that b − b∗ is positive by assumption. We now consider
each part of Proposition 4 in turn:
i. Calculating Wcoop2 −Wcoop1 yields:
Wcoop2 −Wcoop1 = (b− b
∗)(b− b∗ − (16a− 12t))
64
.
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Next, observe that
lim
b−b∗→0
Wcoop2 −Wcoop1 = 0, lim
b−b∗→∞
Wcoop2 −Wcoop1 =∞,
and
∂(Wcoop2 −Wcoop1)
∂(b− b∗) =
b− b∗ − (8a− 6t)
32
,
∂(Wcoop2 −Wcoop1)
∂2(b− b∗) =
1
32
.
Home’s gain from optimal policy cooperation (relative to policy harmonisation)
is thus strictly positive for large cross-country differences and converges to
zero as b − b∗ approaches zero. We furthermore see that for b − b∗ < 8a − 6t
Wcoop2−Wcoop1 decreases in b−b∗, then reaches a minimum at b−b∗ = 8a−6t
and increases thereafter. It then follows that there exist a threshold b′ such
that Wcoop2 −Wcoop1 < (>)0 iff b − b∗ < (>) b′. It is easily verified that the
threshold b′ equals 4(4a− 3t).
ii. Calculating W ∗coop2 −W ∗coop1 yields:
Wcoop2 −Wcoop1 = (b− b
∗)(b− b∗ + (16a− 12t))
64
,
which is always positive for b− b∗ > 0.
D Appendix to Section 6.2
D.1 Reaction Functions and Second-Order Conditions
If governments choose the level of wage subsidies non-cooperatively, the reaction
function s(s∗) for Home will read:
s =
4es∗ + 4b(8− e− e2)− (2− e)(4 + e)(2a− t)
4(8− e2) . (69)
The system of reaction functions is stable as we have
∣∣∣∂s(s∗)∂s∗ ∣∣∣ = e8−e2 < 1 for e ∈
[0, 1]. Moreover, the second order-conditions for a maximum are also fulfilled:
∂2V E
∂2s
=
∂2V E∗
∂2s∗
=
−8(8− e2)
64− 20e2 + e4 < 0. (70)
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If governments agree to cooperate, the second-order condition will be given by
∂2(V E + V E∗)
∂2s
=
−16
(4− e)(2 + e) < 0. (71)
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